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THE SUPREME COURT'S HEIGHTENED REVIEW
OF LAND USE EXACTIONS IN
DOLAN V. CITY OF TIGARD
by Lynda L. ButlerO
On June 24, 1994, the United States Supreme Court decided Dolan v. City of Tigard, a
case with potentially farreaching consequences for exactions and other land use regulations. 62
U.S .L.W. 4576 (June 24, 1994). In a 5-4 decision, the Court reversed and remanded an Oregon
Supreme Court decision upholding conditions requiring the applicants of a building permit to
dedicate portions of their land for a public greenway to minimize flooding and for a
pedestrianlbicycle path to relieve traffic congestion. 854 P.2d 437 (Or. 1993), rev'd, 62 U.S.L.W.
4576 (June 24, 1994). The landowners in Dolan had applied for a permit to expand their
commercial use of the land. [d. at 438. In reversing the Oregon Supreme Court decision to
uphold the permit conditions, the United States Supreme Court held that the city did not meet
its burden under takings law of demonstrating "the required degree of connection between the
exactions and the projected impact of the proposed development." 62 U.S.L.W. at 4579,4581.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist set forth a two-part test for evaluating
the legitimacy of the permit conditions under the takings principles of the United States
Constitution. First, the Court must "determine whether the 'essential nexus ' exists between the
' legitimate state interest' and the permit condition exacted by the city." [d. at 4579. If the Court
finds that this nexus exists, then it must decide whether the "required degree of connection" exists
"between the exactions and the projected impact of the proposed development." [d. According
to the majority, the phrase "'rough proportionality' best encapsulates ll what is necessary under
this second part of the test and is close to the "reasonable relationship" test already adopted by
a majority of state courts. [d. at 4580. The Court further explained that its "rough
proportionality" standard did not require a "precise mathematical calculation," but it did mean
that the city had to "make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication
is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development." Id. [footnote
omitted].
In announcing the second part of its takings test, the Court recognized that it was going
beyond its decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). As
Rehnquist explained, the Court resolved the dispute in Nollan on the basis of the essential nexus
standard, concluding that not even the loosest nexus standard was met in Nollan. Dolan, 62
U.S.L.W. at 4579. The Nollan Court therefore did not have to reach the second level of inquiry
about the required degree of connection between the exactions and the projected impact of the
proposed development. That second level of inquiry, by contrast, was critical to the resolution

OMs. Butler is a Professor of Law at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and
Mary, in Williamsburg, Virginia, the editor of the Fee Simple, and a member of the Board of
Governors of the Real Property Section of the Virginia State Bar.

22

of Dolan. It forced the Court to focus more precisely on the distinction between a valid exercise
of the police power and an invalid exercise of eminent domain, asking whether, in the case
before it, there was a sufficient connection between the permit conditions and the adverse effects
of the proposed development. See id. at 4580.
In applying the first part of its test, the Court quickly found that the permit conditions met
the essential nexus standard. The Court explained that the prevention of flooding and the
reduction of traffic congestion qualified as legitimate public purposes and that an essential nexus
existed between those public interests and the permit conditions. The nexus existed between the
public interest of flood prevention and the condition limiting development within the floodplain
(by requiring dedication of greenway space) because the proposed development would expand
the impervious surface on the property and therefore increase stormwater run-off into the nearby
creek. Furthermore, providing for alternative means of transportation (through the dedication of
a pedestrianlbicycle pathway) would reduce traffic congestion by removing potential vehicles
from the roads. [d. at 4579.
The permit conditions did not, however, meet the rough proportionality standard.
Although the Court acknowledged that keeping the floodplain free from development would limit
the pressures of the proposed development on the nearby creek, the Court did not understand how
this fact justified the requirement that the landowner dedicate land in the floodplain to the public.
Requiring a private greenway also would have furthered the public interest of flood prevention,
but would have differed in one significant respect from the public greenway dedication
requirement: the landowner would have retained the right to exclude, one of the most
fundamental rights of property owners. Had the proposed development encroached on an existing
public greenway, the city could have required the landowner to provide alternative greenway
space for the public. But since such a situation did not exist in Dolan, the Court concluded that
the city had failed to show the "required reasonable relationship" between the floodplain easement
requirement and the proposed development. [d. at 4581.
The pedestrianlbicycle pathway requirement also did not have the required degree of
connection to the proposed development. The Court recognized, as a preliminary matter, that
"[d]edications for streets, sidewalks, and public ways are generally reasonable exactions to avoid
excessive congestion from a proposed property use." ld. In this particular case, however, the
city had not met its burden of "demonstrating that the additional number of vehicles and bicycle
trips generated by the ... [proposed] development reasonably relate to the city's requirement for
a dedication of the pedestrianlbicycle pathway easement." ld. The city had simply found that
the pathway "'could offset some of the traffic demand.'" ld. To meet its burden, the city must
provide some quantitative evidence to support its finding.
Besides imposing what appears to be a new requirement to measure the degree of
connection between a condition and the impacts of a proposed development, the decision in
Dolan also represents a clear shift in the allocation of the burden of proof from the landowner
to government in at least some exaction cases. In evaluating land use regulations affecting
economic interests in property, the Court traditionally has accorded government a presumption
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of constitutional validity. See id. at 4583-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting); MANDElKER DANIEL R.,
JULES B. GERARD & E. THOMAS SUU.JVAN, FEDERAL LAND USE l...A.w § 1.03 (1986 & Release
#1, Feb. 1988) & § 6.06 (Release #4, Feb. 1991). The majority opinion in Dolan clearly denies
the legitimacy of this presumption at least in those land use cases involving an adjudicative
decision affecting a particular property owner - as opposed to land use cases involving generally
applicable zoning regulations. 62 U.S.L.W. at 4580 n.8 (majority opinion). Instead, in those
adjudicative cases, government bears the burden of justifying the exaction imposed on a particular
tract of land by showing a rough proportionality between the exaction and the impacts of the
proposed development. To meet this burden, government must demonstrate that it "ma[d]e some
effort to quantify its findings" in support of the condition imposed on the particular landowner.
Id.at 4581. Before Nolan, government generally had not been required to make such an
individualized determination to justify economic regulation under the due process or takings
clauses of the federal Constitution.
Justice Rehnquist provided two potentially important ways to distinguish and limit Dolan.
In setting the stage for the articulation of the two-part test, Rehnquist stressed that Dolan differed
from many of the Court's other takings decisions. First, Dolan was different because it involved
an adjudicative decision to condition a permit application on an individual parcel; other cases,
in contrast, involved challenges to "essentially legislative determinations" having general
applicability. Id. at 4578. Second, the permit conditions in Dolan required the landowner to
"deed portions of the property to the city" and did not simply limit the property's use. Id. The
Court recognized that in cases lacking these two elements a land use regulation generally is valid
under the takings clause if it substantially advances legitimate state interests and does not deny
an owner economically viable use. Id.
While Rehnquist's discussion of Dolan's distinguishing factors suggests that Dolan will
have limited impact, the Court's subsequent action in vacating a California decision and
remanding it for reconsideration in light of Dolan suggests otherwise. In that decision the owner
of an unsuccessful private tennis club proposed to demolish the club and build townhouses
instead. The city was willing to allow the change in use if the property owner paid an amount
to mitigate the loss of recreational facilities, as well as an art fee to offset the opportunity for the
creation of cultural and artistic assets lost because of development. See Ehrlich v. City of Culver
City, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (1993), vacated, 114 S.O. 2731 (1994). The Court's action suggests
that many land use regulatory decisions could now fall within the scope of Dolan. As long as
a landowner is challenging how a regulation has been applied and as long as the regulatory
process involved a compromise allowing development if certain conditions were met, the
challenge would appear to involve the type of adjudicative decision identified by Rehnquist as
his first distinguishing factor. Further, the Court's vacation of the California decision suggests
that the second distinguishing factor - the deeding of property - may not be necessary.
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